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LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIRE LANDS WITHIN A STATE
OR:
THE METAMORPHOSIS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION
" . . and to exercise like Authority over all Places pur-
chased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be .. . "--Art. I, Sec. 8, U. S. Const.
Has the Federal Government the power to condemn pri-
vate lands within a State? If so, what is the source of that
power? And is the power absolute, or is it subject to limita-
tions and restrictions? These are the questions which this
paper will attempt to answer.
In the famous steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,'-which dealt primarily with the sec-
ondary issue of seizure by the President without Congres-
sional authorization-, both Mr. Justice Douglas in his con-
curring opinion and Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in his dissent
asserted, in passing, the existence in the Federal Government
of the power of eminent domain. Said Douglas: "The power
of the Federal Government to condemn property is well estab-
lished." Said the Chief Justice: "The power of eminent do-
main, invoked in this case, is an essential attribute of sov-
ereignty2 and has long been recognized as a power of the
Federal Government." Both Douglas and Vinson cited as
their authority the case of Kohl v. United States,3 an 1876
case which may be regarded as the final major step in the
establishment of the modern concept of Federal eminent
domain.
The Kohl case bases the Federal Government's right of emi-
nent domain primarily on the theory that eminent domain is
an incident of sovereignty, rather than on any grant, express
or implied, in the Constitution. This reliance on the "sov-
ereignty" theory may seem somewhat surprising on the part
of the 1876 court; it is somewhat more surprising that Chief
1. 343 U. S. 579 (1952).
2. Wherever italics appear in this paper, they have been supplied by
the author, except of course in cases of Latin phrases, case names, etc.
3. 91 U. S. 367 (1876).
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Justice Vinson should have, in 1952, taken up this line of
reasoning. For, leaving aside completely the question of
whether a government of delegated and enumerated powers
can be truly "sovereign" in the first place, the Supreme
Court has for a long time tended, in controversies of a re-
lated nature, to frown rather strongly on the idea that a
power can be possessed by the Federal Government simply
because that power is an attribute of sovereignty.4
Be that as it may, in the Kohl case those provisions of the
Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8; and Amendment V) which indi-
cate or imply a power of eminent domain in the Federal
Government were touched upon only casually, almost inci-
dentally; while the "attribute of sovereignty" theory was as-
serted, explained, rationalized, justified, and hammered home.
Arguing for the United States, Assistant Attorney-General
Edwin B. Smith set the tone as follows: "Though some have
denied to the United States the right of eminent domain, we
presume it will not be seriously contested now and here. It is
inherent in the very idea of sovereignty; an inseparable inci-
dent of sovereignty." And the majority opinion in the case,
written by Mr. Justice Strong, embraced his argument on this
point completely.
But let us not devote too much time, at this juncture at
least, to condemning the court for concentrating on the wrong
reason. Whatever the source, whether "attribute of sover-
eignty" or constitutional grant, it seems clear that the Fed-
eral Government does possess the bare right to condemn
for public use lands situated within a State.
But now we come to the heart of the matter-is this right
absolute, or is it restricted? Corpus Juris Secundum, while
espousing the attribute-of-sovereignty theory and denying the
necessity of constitutional grant, goes on to say :5 "The right
4. In Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907), when counsel for the
United States, as intervenor, urged upon the Court a doctrine of "sov-
ereign and inherent" power, the Court replied as follows: "But the
proposition that there are legislative powers affecting the Nation as a
whole which belong to, although not expressed in the grant of powers,
is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a government of enu-
merated powers. That this is such a government clearly appears from
the Constitution, independently of the Amendments .... This natural
construction of the original body of the Constitution is made absolutely
certain by the Tenth Amendment. This Amendment, which was seem-
ingly adopted with prescience of just such contention as the present,
disclosed the widespread fear that the National Government might, under
the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise powers
which had not been granted."
5. 29 C. J. S., Eminent Domain § 3 (1941).
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of eminent domain is not conferred, but may be recognized,
limited, or regulated by constitutions."
It is here contended that the Federal Government's right
of eminent domain is limited, and limited severely, by two
provisions of the Constitution, one in the body of that instru-
ment, the other in an Amendment. The Amendment is of
course the Fifth, and the limitation therein is well recognized
and has been universally abided by: ". .. nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 6
The other provision in question, the one in the body of the
Constitution itself, (Art. I, Sec. 8), has not been so kindly
dealt with. On the contrary, it has been subjected to a most
extraordinary word-juggling process, a process which repre-
sents perhaps the most flagrant (yet one of the least-known)
of all the examples of constitution-twisting indulged in by
the consolidationist school-exceeding in boldness, if not in
far-reaching effect, even the apparently illimitable stretching
of the interstate commerce clause.
For the limitation in question, while stated indirectly, is
stated perfectly clearly. The provision reads: [The Congress
shall have Power... ]
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases whatso-
ever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square)
as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Accept-
ance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government
of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of
the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other need-
ful Buildings.
Nothing could be more clear: Congress is given the power
of exclusive jurisdiction over such lands within the States
as may be acquired, for the stated purposes, by the Federal
Government--such acquisition being dependent upon the con-
sent of the Legislature of the affected State.7
In the face of this constitutional clause, it is hard to believe
that any jurist could have asserted that there were other
6. This Amendment, of course, does not in any way supersede, but
only supplements, the other limitation-that of State consent-on the
Federal Government's right to acquire lands within a State.
7. Whether consent must be affirmatively granted in each case or
will be presumed in the absence of a resolution of objection is a sec-
ondary question which we need not consider here.
476 [Vol. 9
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ways in which the Federal Government might acquire land
within a State. Can it be seriously contended that the words
"by the Consent of the Legislature . . . "--placed directly
after the word "purchased" and modifying it-would have
been inserted if the framers had intended that the Federal
Government should also possess the power to acquire such
lands without the consent of the State Legislature? The men
who framed the Constitution were not in the habit of wasting
words or of inserting them for no purpose-they meant that
what lands the government might need for the stated pur-
poses could be purchased with the consent, and only with the
consent, of the Legislature of the affected State.8
The mere fact that the limitation is expressed indirectly and
parenthetically rather than affirmatively is no excuse at all
for failure to abide by it. The meaning is the same as if the
provision read: " ... shall have power to exercise like author-
ity over such areas as may be purchased for the erection of
forts , . .and other needful buildings, such areas to be ac-
quired, of course, only by the consent of the Legislature of
the State in which they lie."
And how does the Supreme Court now "interpret" this clear
mandate of the framers? Let us quote briefly from the case
of James v. Dravo Contracting Company :9
It is not questioned that the State may refuse its con-
sent and retain jurisdiction consistent with the govern-
mental purposes for which the property was acquired.
The right of eminent domain inheres in the Federal gov-
ernment by virtue of its sovereignty and thus it may,
regardless of the wishes either of the owners or of the
8. This is beyond dispute, as shown by the Madison papers. The
consent provision, missing from the original draft, was inserted specifi-
cally to give the States the right to veto Federal land acquisition.
"So much of the fourth clause as related to the seat of government
was agreed to, nem. con.
"On the residue, to wit, 'to exercise like authority over all places
purchased for forts, &c.'
"Mr. GERRY contended that this power might be made use of to
enslave any particular State by buying up its territory, and that the
strong holds proposed would be. a means of awing the State into an
undue obedience to the General Government.
"Mr. KING thought, himself, the provision unnecessary, the power
being already involved; but would move to insert, after the word 'pur-
chased,' the words, 'by the Consent of the Legislature of the State. This
would certainly make the power safe.
"Mr. GOUVENEUR MORRIS seconded the motion, which was agreed
to, nem. con.; as was the residue of the clause, as amended."
See p. 1496, Madison's Reports of Debates in the Federal Convention.
9. 302 U. S. 134 (1937).
1957]
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States, acquire the lands which it needs within their bor-
ders. Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367, 371, 372, 23 L. Ed. 449,
451. In that event, as in cases of acquisition by purchase
without consent of the State, jurisdiction is dependent
upon cession by the State and the State may qualify its
cession by reservations not inconsistent with the govern-
mental uses ....
This is indeed a metamorphosis. The phrase "by the con-
sent of the legislature" has been bodily lifted from its posi-
tion after the word "purchased"-which word it was clearly
intended to modify, as demonstrated in the Madison papers-
and has been made instead to modify the phrase "to exercise
like authority." In other words, in the eyes of the Court,
the provision now reads: "The Congress shall have power
to exercise exclusive legislation, provided the State Legisla-
ture consents thereto, over such lands as may be purchased
for the erection of forts, magazines, etc."
How was such a change in meaning wrought? Obviously,
the idea of State consent as a prerequisite to the Federal
Government's acquisition of necessary lands was intolerabld
to the advocates of consolidation and national supremacy
(who have, generally speaking, dominated the Supreme Court
from John Marshall's day on). Yet they could not ignore
completely the existence of the passage "by the consent ......
Their only alternative, therefore, was simply to juggle the
clause to suit themselves-which they did.'0
But let the Court speak for itself. In the Kohl case, Mr.
Justice Strong laid down the new line, in the following pass-
age, more insistent in tone than convincing:
The consent of a state can never be a condition precedent
to its [the power's] enjoyment. Such consent is needed
only, if at all, for the transfer of jurisdiction and of the
right of exclusive legislation after the land shall have
been acquired.
10. Thus providing a vivid demonstration of a tendency noted by Pro-
fessor Walter F. Dodd in his Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in
Constitutional Law, 29 Yale L. J. 137 (1919): "The court is an organ
of the national government, associated with that government, and has in
the long run shown a disposition to support national powers."
It does not take a Professor Dodd to see the danger and injustice in-
herent in the Marshallian concept of the Supreme Court as final arbiter
of Federal-State disputes. The Anglo-Saxons recognized it long ago and
so developed as one of their basic axioms the rule that "no man shall
be judge in his own cause." Is it any more sensible or just for the final
arbiter of disputes between the United States and a State to be a branch
of the United States Government: the Supreme Court?
478 [Vol. 9
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But it was left to Mr. Justice Field (whose opinion in the
Kohl case, in which he dissented on a secondary issue, indi-
cates that he at least had some doubts about Strong's sweep-
ing assertion) to lay bare the process by which, without any
amendment, this constitutional limitation on Federal power
was subverted and brazenly given a different meaning, one
that was harmless to the concept of national supremacy. In
his opinion setting forth the holding of the Court in Fort
Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe,'1 Field explains:
This power of exclusive legislation is to be exercised,
as thus seen, over places purchased, by consent of the
Legislatures of the States in which they are situated, for
the specific purposes enumerated. It would seem to have
been the opinion of the framers of the Constitution, that
without the consent of the States, the new government
would not be able to acquire lands within them; and
therefore it was provided that when it might require
such lands for the erection of forts and other buildings
* . . , and the consent of the states in which they were
situated was obtained for their acquisition, such consent
should carry with it political dominion and legislative au-
thority over them. Purchase with such consent was the
only mode then thought of for the acquisition by the
General Government of title to lands in the states.
Continuing, Field now describes the metamorphosis:
Since the adoption of the Constitution this view has
not generally prevailed. Such consent has not always
been obtained, nor supposed necessary, for the purchase
by the General Government of lands within the States.
If any doubt has ever existed as to its power thus to ac-
quire lands within the states, it has not had sufficient
strength to create any effective dissent from the general
opinion. The consent of the states to the purchase of
lands within them is, however, essential, under the Con-
stitution, to the transfer to the General Government, with
the title, of political jurisdiction and domain. Where
lands are acquired without such consent, the possession
of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded
to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary
proprietor. The property in that case, unless used as a
means to carry out the purposes of the government, is
11. 114 U. S. 525 (1885).
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subject to the legislative authority and control of the
States equally with the property of private individuals.
That this view (the view held by the framers that the
Federal Government could acquire land within a State only by
the consent of the State) "has not generally prevailed" since
the adoption of the Constitution is no accident. Consolidation-
ists very early began the process of making the consent pro-
vision modify "exercise like authority" instead of "pur-
chase". 12 And one can easily see why they did: the consent
of the State as a prerequisite to Federal acquisition of land
would be a potent weapon by which the States could resist
the trend toward that centralization of power so eagerly pro-
moted by the Federalists.
Let us summarize briefly the present position of the Court
and of our modern constitutional theory in respect to this
matter of eminent domain:
1) The Federal Government definitely is a sovereign gov-
ernment; yet it possesses only those powers granted it by the
Constitution, for it is a government of delegated and enumer-
ated powers.
2) But as to eminent domain, the Federal Government
possesses this particular power as an attribute of its sov-
ereignty.
3) And as to the constitutional provision which makes
State consent a prerequisite to the exercise of eminent do-
main-well, such a provision simply cannot be permitted to
exist, as it would seriously jeopardize the basic principle of
national supremacy and sovereignty as well as cripple the
Federal Government in its operations.
4) But we cannot completely ignore the presence of this
consent provision, so what we'll do is, we'll just juggle it
around to mean something else.
The above summary is of course couched in somewhat face-
tious terms, but in substance it represents truly the position
of the Court.
It is here submitted that so patently absurd and preposter-
ous a theory in the body of our constitutional law should not
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be allowed to stand. Let us hope that if and when a test case' s
does reach the Supreme Court, that body will look the Consti-
tution squarely in the face and declare what the Constitution
says-namely, that the Federal Government cannot acquire
land within a State without the consent (either express or,
in the absence of objection, implied) of the State Legislature.
To the argument that recognition of such a weapon in the
hands of the States would tie completely the hands of the
Federal Government and threaten national security and na-
tional welfare, the answer is: the Constitution provides an
orderly method for its own amendment. If the Federal Gov-
ernment must have the power of eminent domain without
restriction, let it gain that power by the only method pre-
scribed and recognized by the Constitution, even if great
concessions must be made to the States in return for ratifi-
cation.
There are those who will cry: "Hold up! This is a time-
honored doctrine! The rule of the Kohl case has been the law
as to eminent domain since 1876 and, right or wrong, it must
remain the law. Stare decisis!" This is obviously not a valid
argument-more than once the Court has dealt it an emphatic
rebuttal.'4 In considering this matter of eminent domain, let
us all bear in mind what Mr. Justice Holmes said nearly
thirty years ago' 5 in urging the abandonment of another time-
honored but erroneous doctrine:' s " . . The prevailing doc-
trine has been accepted upon a subtle fallacy .... The fallacy
has resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of power by
the courts of the United States which no lapse of time or re-
spectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to cor-
rect."
13. The bringing of a test case should not be difficult. Take a situa-
tion where the Federal Government is seeking to condemn land for, say,
the construction of a hydroelectric project which has strong opposition in
the State at large. Have the Legislature pass a formal resolution for-
bidding Federal acquisition, and let one of the affected landowners intro-
duce said resolution in the condemnation proceedings as a defense.
14. Most notably in recent years in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U. S. 483 (1954), in which the rule of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.
587 (1896), was struck down.
15. In 1928, in his famous dissent in Black & White Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co. v. Brown and Yellow T. & T. Co., 276 U. S. 518 (1928).
16. That of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1806), which was
finally overturned-after holding sway for 132 years-by Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
1957]
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CONCLUSION
That such a legal muddle as has been described above
should exist in our constitutional law is indeed deplorable;
but the fact might as well be faced that such situations are
going to exist so long as the notion persists that the Federal
Government has sovereignty.
This is the root of the fallacy of the Kohl case, on which
faulty foundation the whole structure of Federal eminent
domain is built.
"Sovereignty" as correctly used is a word of precise mean-
ing. Unfortunately, however, it began to be used loosely in
the early days of the republic, to designate the "sum of pow-
ers" possessed by a government; and, understandably, its re-
peated use in this context gave many people, even eminent
jurists, 17 the idea that it, sovereignty, was divisible; for
powers may always be divided, by delegation'8 or otherwise,
so why not the "sum of powers"?
But true sovereignty -"the ultimate will of the political
community"-is never divisible; and any attempt to treat it
as divisible can only result in just the sort of political schizo-
phrenia that the court's views on eminent domain exemplify.
Actually, even if sovereignty did reside in the Federal Gov-
ernment, the Court's position would still be untenable in this
particular case-eminent domain-since, sovereign or not,
the Federal Government's right is strictly limited by the con-
stitutional requirement of State consent. But the whole er-
roneous structure built up in the Kohl case-the "attribute of
sovereignty" argument and all the rest of it-could never
have come into being had not jurists been under a misappre-
hension as to the nature and locus of sovereignty: that over-
whelmingly important concept which even today still plagues
Federal-State relationships.
MARION H. SASS.
17. See, for example, Judge Story's comments on sovereignty.
18. This is what was effected by means of the Constitution: a division
of powers, through delegation. Originally, all powers, as well as sov-
ereignty, were in the hands of the States. Then, first by means of the
Articles of Confederation, and finally by means of that written instru-
ment known as the Constitution, the States delegated certain of their
powers (some of them very broad ones) to a central agency known as
the Federal Government. It is important to remember that the word
used in the Constitution-see the Tenth Amendment-is not "surren-
dered," but "delegated": a word of entirely different meaning implying
a principal-agent relationship. The important thing to remember here is
that only powers were involved, not sovereignty. Whatever the extent
of the powers which the States entrusted to the Federal Government,
their sovereignty they retained.
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